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TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION VULNERABILITIES 
Abstract 
Corporative giants of the internet, such as Google, Facebook, Various Banks have being using 
the two-factor authentication technique to ensure security to its users. Although, this companies 
don’t make this kind operations by themselves, they hire third part companies to do so, 
integrating the API products for onwards delivery. Because of this, technique have serious 
breaches that can be explored by a ill-intentioned company.  The third part companies stays 
between the client and the website being in a privileged place to attack any unsuspecting victim. 
Keywords: ​internet, 2FA, data security, attacks, breaches. 
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Two-Factor Authentication Vulnerabilities 
Introduction 
How would you recover your password if you simply forget it today? The answer for this 
question has being the two-factor authentication (2FA) for a while now. The vast majority of the 
biggest websites companies are using it, it has turned into a pattern. 
It is perfect as it allows the user to recover its credentials in a practical way, simply receiving a 
message in the cellphone on a call from the company you desire to retrieve you credentials from. 
However, this study shows that, in most cases, this is not as secure as it might be. In fact, it 
carries a dangerous threat within. According to (Toorani & Beheshti, 2008) “Data 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation are the most important security 
services in the security criteria that should be taken into account in many secure applications. 
However, such requirements are not provided by the traditional SMS messaging”. 
Private user and various companies trust the leading players in the internet – Google, Facebook, 
LinkedIn, Twitter, etc. – by giving them permission to hold and process their sensitive data. 
Still, more and more people provide their data to these large enterprises, but a limited number of 
them take into account the existence of some background companies, the ones who sell the 
two-factor authentication solutions. 
These background companies position themselves in a privileged spot, they are able to either 
give what they were hired to do or to pick up accounts and sell the access to these accounts to 
someone else. 
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Considering the following assumptions: 
● Company A specializes in PIN code deliveries through Phone Calls or SMS; 
● Company A grows big through merges and acquisitions; 
● Company A starts providing services to Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Twitter and 
Banks; 
Consequently, every time one decides to change its password or login through phone, by call or 
by SMS, Company A would have to be called to send the code via API. 
Normal Flow versus Attack Pattern 
Internet security and information technology are too centralized and the current implementation 
of double securing accounts have to be discussed. According to (Rosenblatt & Cipriani, 2015) 
“Account recovery works as a tool for breaking two-factor authentication because it "bypasses" 
2FA entirely”. So, instead of securing the users’ account, the current model of 2FA makes it 
even more vulnerable.  
This idea is described in the following descriptions of the normal 2FA flow and of the Attack 
Pattern. The steps of the normal flow, as seen in Figure 1, can be described as: 
● Person X asks for a password reset via 2FA, to a bank; 
● The bank requests the 2FA provider,  Company A, to generate a PIN code via API; 
● Person X receives the code; 
● Person X enters the code; 
● The bank validates the code. 
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Figure 1.​ Regular request flow. 
As seemed, every time Person X decides to change its password or login through phone, by call 
or by SMS, Company A have to be called to send the code. Therefore, a Person Y, working for 
Company A, will see all personal data regarding Person X. 
Therefore, the Attack Pattern, as seen in Figure 2, is as follows: 
● Person Y, at Company A, starts, in Person X’s name, a password reset; 
● Person Y intercepts the password reset message; 
● Person Y login into Person X account without Person X noticing. 
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Figure 2​. Attack Pattern. 
This Attack Pattern is in use, many people have reported that they had their LinkedIn and 
Facebook accounts hacked. 
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Actual Attacks 
Realizing a forensic investigation of the systems, it has being revealed that the following 
scenario is being used to successfully hack accounts. 
 
Figure 3. Successfully changing password screen. 
 
From the above image, it is clear that the email shows that a password reset had been done using 
Chrome on a windows device located in the United States. The login sessions can also be used to 
detect cases of successful account hacking as can be seen in the screenshot below. 
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Figure 4.​ IP Address Owner. 
 
Figure 4 shows two active logins using Chrome, from Windows, and the location is in the United 
States, and more important from the RIPE allocated IP block that has been assigned to one of the 
biggest 2FA providers on the world that process Google, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and many 
other Services. 
SMS/Voice MSU market works just like a stock market, each call has a price and, considering 
this price, after the code is submitted from the social network for upward delivery, the delivery 
company chooses the “least cost route” / less expensive 2FA provider.  
The problem resides in the fact that there is no encryption in this submission from the social 
media service so, the entire 2FA transmission is made openly. Figure 5 shows a captured traffic 
from one of these submissions.  Figure 6 shows the translation from the code captured to the 
code received by the user. 
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Figure 5.​ 2FA transmission. 
 
Figure 6.​ Google verification code. 
 
Methods to achieve targeted attack 
As mentioned before, the call through the “least cost route” to the 2FA provider, using the price 
of the SMS/Voice calls. Thus, a targeted attack can be achieved by dropping these SMS/Voice 
calls prices on the global market by single 2FA provider. The attacker (the ill-intentioned 2FA 
provider) chooses a victim, then, drops the price for the victim’s specific country and operator. 
Therefore, because of the least cost routing, it is a matter of minutes until the traffic is re-routed 
towards the attacker platform.  
 
TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION VULNERABILITIES 
However, the attackers do not want to be discovered, so, they employ cunnings tricks to stay 
undercover. Figure 7 shows a table of prefixes’ numbers for companies in UK. 
 
Figure 7.​ UK numbering plan of prefixes issued by Ofcom. 
 
As seen in the table, the prefixes from 078731 to 078739 are allocated to O2. But, Company X 
allocated the prefix 07830 from Ofcom, and this is used to send “Social Networks verifications”. 
Operators worldwide will try to short-down the lists of Global Titles, which has similar rules to 
iptables, and most of them have only prefix 07873 that is assigned to O2. 
With the low price strategy the traffic is accepted even there is no Roaming Agreement with X 
(based on O2), the operator then, thinks the invoice goes to O2, when it is going to X. 
Even if O2 don’t have any Roaming Agreement made, it is always good for small operators to 
receive messages originated in giant companies. 
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Using a number from the example pool, in a voip white channel, returns always the operator as 
O2, even for China Telecom. This allocation for “prefix in a sandwich” only occurs in this case, 
for UK or anywhere in the world. 
 
 
Failover approach 
 
Due to the fact of more than 2000 operators worldwide, it’s considerable that a single entity such 
as Bank, Social Media Platform or any company is in unprivileged position to setup a roaming 
agreement with all of them, assuming the entity is operating world-wide. It’s also safe to assume, 
that single 2FA supplier could experience technical difficulties from time to time. In order to 
assure best quality at least cost, these companies do sign with multiple 2FA suppliers. 
According to tests committed, by monitoring message delivery SMSC (Short Messaging Service 
Center), it’s enough to simulate “I have not received a message” using different IP’s and 
accounts for a single operator via Google platform, in order for Google to change the delivery 
path (a company that delivers the Code). This has been determined by an SMSC changes after 
multiple “complaints” that the verification message is not received. Therefore, it’s just a matter 
of enough simulated complaints, even if there’s no technical difficulties to trick the google into 
changing the routing towards the attacker. 
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Conclusion 
This study presents forensic evidences that there is a serious breach in the 2FA authentication 
model. Even more, this study shows that there is a sophisticated scheme capable of controlling 
the whole market and getting access to any account at any time. 
If this is really happening institutionally, not as a part of action of privileged employee then it is 
affecting the whole Internet community, with potential for strongly positioned company to 
exploit the vulnerability of the topology itself, present losses on the regular side of business 
while making enormous amount of profits by selling the targeted accounts on the blackmarket, 
committing sophisticated account attacks, generating enormous sum of profit, while presenting 
as not profitable, therefore charged less taxes, if any, leaving very little evidences to even 
become suspicious.  
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